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Abstract
Following the introduction of the euro, the markets for large debt financing 
experienced a historical expansion. We investigate the financial factors behind the 
issuance of syndicated loans for an extensive sample of euro area non-financial 
corporations. For the first time we compare these factors to those of its major 
competitor: the corporate bond market. We find that large firms, with greater financial 
leverage, more (verifiable) profits and higher liquidation values tend to prefer 
syndicated loans. In contrast, firms with larger levels of short-term debt and those 
perceived by markets as having more growth opportunities favour financing through 
corporate bonds. 
JEL Classification: D40, F30, G21 
 area  area
Keywords: syndicated loans, corporate bonds, debt choice, the euro area. 5
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Non-technical summary 
Debt constitutes by far the major source of external financing for large firms. Since 
the introduction of the euro syndicated loans and corporate bonds have become the 
main sources for large debt financing: in both markets, firms can raise large amounts 
of funds with medium and long-term maturities. Today, many of Europe’s largest 
firms use corporate bonds and syndicated loans extensively and, often, simultaneously 
to finance their investments. We investigate how the financial characteristics of firms 
influence their debt choice between raising funds in the syndicated loan market and 
raising funds directly via the corporate bond market. 
This is one of the first attempts to consider the determinants of financing choices 
including syndicated loans as a separate asset class and a direct competitor to 
corporate bond financing. While there is extensive literature concerned with bank 
lending and direct bond financing, most studies consider the financing instruments 
individually. Alternatively they compare the choice of public debt (i.e. corporate 
bonds) to bilateral bank loans, but not syndicated loans.  
We build on prior studies and link the choice of debt instrument to the specific 
characteristics of firms measured prior to the financing decision. We use a unique 
dataset, which includes 2,460 syndicated loan and bond transactions issued by 1,377 
listed non-financial corporations in the euro area between 1993 and 2006. 
We show that firms that are larger, more profitable, more highly levered, with a 
higher proportion of fixed to total assets and fewer growth options prefer syndicated 
loans over bond financing. We argue that, in the debt pecking order, syndicated loans 
are the preferred instrument on the extreme end where firms are very large, have high 
credibility and profitability, but fewer growth opportunities.   
Our findings also provide some evidence to the discussion of whether the recent 
developments in syndicated loan markets (such as the development of a significant 
secondary market) have triggered a convergence between bond and syndicated loan 
markets from the perspective of a firm’s choice of debt. The results presented suggest 
that, in the euro area, the characteristics (and probable motivation) of very large firms 
to tap these markets are not alike. However, when considered as part of spectrum of 6
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debt options for all firms (regardless of their size) the characteristics of firms tapping 
these two alternative markets are found to be similar.   
1.  Introduction  
 
Debt is the major source of external financing for large corporations. In 2007, 
corporate bonds and syndicated loans made up 94% of all public funds raised in the 
European capital markets, while public equity issuance accounted for only 6%. In 
recent years, developments in the corporate bond market have attracted considerable 
attention, particularly in the light of the market’s spectacular development in the 
aftermath of the introduction of the euro. In parallel, the syndicated loan market has 
also developed, albeit more progressively, currently accounting for around one-third 
of borrowers’ total public debt and equity financing. Unquestionably, syndicated 
loans are the main alternative to direct corporate bond financing: In both markets, 
firms can tap the financial markets to raise large amounts of funds with medium and 
long-term maturities.  
Today, many of Europe’s largest firms use corporate bonds and syndicated loans 
extensively and, often, simultaneously to finance their investments. Here we aim to 
investigate the factors that influence European firms’ marginal choice of issuing debt 
between these two sources of funding. Building on Denis and Mihov (2003), we 
concentrate on incremental financing decisions. This focus allows us to link the 
choice of debt market to the specific characteristics of firms measured prior to the 
financing decision.    
From a theoretical perspective, corporate financing decisions are characterised by 
agency costs and asymmetric information problems. This would include the decision 
of whether to obtain direct financing via the corporate bond market or financing from 
banks through the syndicated loan market. 
1 In the case of financing through the 
syndicated loan market, the theory of financial intermediation has placed special 
emphasis on the role of banks in monitoring and screening borrowers, which is costly 
for banks. However, it also has its advantages because the substantial investment that 
                                                 
1 This runs contrary to the Modigliani-Miller (1958) assumptions, which resulted in the “irrelevance 
hypothesis” regarding corporate financing decisions. 7
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substantial investment that banks make in funding borrowers, as well as the longer-
lasting nature of such relationships, increases the benefits to banks of information 
acquisition (Boot and Thakor (2008)). 
In the case of funding via the corporate bond market, the monitoring of borrowers by 
many creditors, as is the case in the corporate bond market, could lead to unnecessary 
costs and free-riding problems. Namely, it would be easier for corporate bond market 
investors than for syndicated loans to replicate the investment strategies of investors 
incurring monitoring and screening costs. For this reason, the logic of banks as 
delegated monitors of depositors (Diamond (1984)) would also apply to the 
syndicated loan market, where banks (or uninformed lenders) participating in the 
syndication delegate most of the screening and monitoring to an agent bank (or 
informed lender) (see Homstrom and Tirole (1997) and Sufi (2007)). Therefore, 
certain lead banks could obtain lending specialisation in specific sectors or 
geographical areas and act as delegated monitors of participating banks. 
There is extensive theoretical literature concerned with the coexistence of bank 
lending and direct bond financing (Besanko and Kanatas (1993), Hoshi et al. (1993), 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Boot and Thakor (2000), Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997) and Bolton and Freixas (2000)). In this respect, the theory of financial 
intermediation tends to emphasise that banks and markets compete, so that growth in 
one is at the expense of the other (Allen and Gale (1997) and Boot and Thakor 
(2008)). Some recent literature also analyses potential complementarities between 
bank lending and capital market funding (Diamond (1991), Hoshi et al. (1993) and 
Song and Thakor (2008)). Most of these results are also directly applicable to the 
comparison of funding via syndicated loans as opposed to funding through the 
corporate bond market.
2 
There is also some literature on how firms make their choices between alternative 
debt instruments. It compares public debt (i.e. corporate bonds) with bilateral bank 
loans, rather than with the syndicated market. This literature links the choice of debt 
instrument to factors such as economies of scale, transaction costs, the possibility of 
future debt renegotiation (involving inefficient liquidation) and the mitigation of 
agency costs as a result of banks’ monitoring skills (Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et 8
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al. (1999), Cantillo and Wright (2000), Esho at al. (2001) and Denis and Mihov 
(2003)).  
Here, we consider syndicated loans to be a separate asset class and draw a distinction 
between them and ordinary bilateral loans. This paper starts by focusing on the 
financial determinants of borrowing via the syndicated loan market. It then compares 
this method of financing with the main alternative: the corporate bond market. The 
development of the corporate bond market has been spectacular in the wake of the 
introduction of the euro and, as such, has been extensively analysed in the literature 
(see Biais et al. (2007) and De Bondt and Marqués-Ibáñez (2005), (De Bondt (2005) 
and De Bondt (2004)). On the other hand, the European syndicated loan market has 
attracted far less research attention. 
We argue that the syndicated loan market is the most powerful substitute to the bond 
markets in terms of size and maturity of the funds provided. Our main objective is to 
contribute to the literature on firms’ marginal financing choices by comparing both 
instruments directly. Prior empirical studies document the relationships between the 
use of corporate bond financing and firms’ attributes, such as size, leverage, financial 
stress, liquidity, growth opportunities and profitability (Houston and James (1996), 
Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1998), Cantillo and Wright (2000) and Denis 
and Mihov (2003)). Building on this literature, we investigate how the financial 
characteristics of firms influence the choice between raising funds in the syndicated 
loan market and raising funds directly via the corporate bond markets. Our findings 
also show whether recent developments in syndicated loan markets have triggered 
convergence between these two alternative debt markets in terms of the drivers for 
firms to tap these markets for funds.   
We use a unique dataset, compiled from four different data providers, which includes 
2,460 syndicated loan and bond transactions issued by 1,377 listed non-financial 
corporations in the euro area between 1993 and 2006. In the empirical analysis, we 
model firm’s financial attributes (e.g. size, leverage, financial stress, liquidation value 
and growth indicators), observed prior to the debt issue, as the primary determinant of 
debt choice.     
                                                                                                                                            
2 Theoretically, these models would have the additional complication of the structure of the syndication 
arrangement (see Sufi, 2007). 9
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 briefly introduces the 
syndicated loan market while Section 3 reviews the literature on the determinants of 
firms’ financing choices. Section 4 describes the data sources, provides descriptive 
statistics and explains the empirical methodology used in our analysis. The results of 
our estimations are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  The syndicated loan market  
What are syndicated loans and what makes them different from bilateral loans? A 
typical syndicated loan is issued to a single borrower jointly by a group of lenders. 
These lenders are usually banks, but they can also include other financial institutions. 
Mandated by the borrower, a lead bank (or banks) promotes the loan to potential 
lenders that are interested in taking exposure in certain corporate borrowers. The lead 
arranger provides probable participants with a memorandum including borrower-
specific information. Usually each participant funds the loan at identical conditions 
and is responsible for its particular share of the loan; it therefore has no legal 
responsibility for other participants’ shares. Overall, syndicated loans lie somewhere 
between relationship loans and public debt, where the lead bank may have some form 
of relationship with the borrower – although this is less likely to be the case for banks 
participating in the syndicate at a more junior level. 
Recent developments in the syndicated loan market have made a clearer distinction 
between syndicated loans and bilateral bank loans. One significant change is the 
growth in the regulated and standardised secondary market during the 1990s, which 
has supplied significant amounts of liquidity to the syndicated loan market. Another 
major factor has been the rising number of syndicated loans rated by independent 
rating agencies. As a result of stronger secondary market activity, combined with 
independently rated syndicated loans, there has been a greater recognition of these 
assets by institutional investors as an alternative investment to bonds (Armstrong, 
2003). Certainly, recent changes in the syndicated loan market – including its volume, 
its capacity to provide sizable medium and long-term funding and increased 
transparency – have shifted the syndicated loan market closer to the corporate bond 
market and further away from bilateral bank lending.   10
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3.  Determinants of firms’ financing choices 
Three main arguments are commonly used to explain firms’ choices of financing 
when deciding between public (bonds) and private (bank loans) debt. The flotation 
costs argument posits that the use of public debt entails substantial issuance costs, 
including a large fixed-cost component (Blackwell and Kidwell (1998) and Bhagat 
and Frost (1986)).
3 Accordingly, relatively small public debt issues would not be cost 
efficient and firms would only tap public capital markets when issuing large amounts 
of debt to benefit from economies of scale. This is documented by empirical studies 
that show a positive relationship between the use of public debt financing and a firm’s 
size (Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Denis and Mihov (2003), Esho et al. (2001) and 
Houston and James (1996)).    
The renegotiation and liquidation hypothesis argues that borrowers with a higher ex 
ante probability of financial stress are far less likely to borrow publicly. This is 
because it is more difficult to renegotiate the terms of debt agreements effectively 
with a myriad of bond holders than with a single bank or small group of lenders 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Berlin and Loeys (1988)). Likewise, lenders in 
public debt markets are unable to distinguish, owing to information asymmetry and 
free-rider problems, between the optimality of liquidating or allowing the project to 
continue. If such situations are reflected on the debt contracts in the form of harsh 
covenants, they may, in turn, result in the premature liquidation of profitable projects. 
Empirical evidence indeed suggests a negative relationship between the issuance of 
public debt and proxies for borrowers’ financial stress (Cantillo and Wright (2000), 
Denis and Mihov (2003) and Esho et al. (2001)).   
The information asymmetry hypothesis suggests that a firm’s choice of debt market is 
related to the degree of asymmetric information the firm is exposed to. Information 
asymmetries result in problems of moral hazard between shareholders and debt 
holders, including possible asset substitution and underinvestment (see Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977)). Owing to such problems, a firm faces higher 
contracting costs in the public markets, as lenders who are unable to monitor the 
firm’s activities will demand higher returns for risks generated by information 11
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asymmetries. Indeed, part of early banking theory focuses on private lenders as more 
efficient and effective monitors (Diamond (1984), Fama (1985) and Boyd and 
Prescott (1986)). As a result, firms with greater incentive problems arising from 
information asymmetries are expected to borrow privately given banks’ ability to 
monitor borrowers’ activities and to mitigate moral hazard (see Diamond (1984 and 
1991)). Such monitoring is typically achieved in privately placed debt by 
incorporating restrictive covenants, agreements that are not in standard use in public 
issues (Smith and Warner (1979)). Hence, Krishnaswami et al. (1999) and Denis and 
Mihov (2003) report that firms that are potentially more exposed to problems of moral 
hazard have lower proportions of public debt in their financing choices.  
There are only a handful of empirical studies describing why some firms prefer to 
borrow from public debt markets while others rely on private debt (most of these are 
mentioned above).
4 Moreover, these studies rarely incorporate syndicated loans as a 
debt choice in their analysis. Denis and Mihov (2003) and Houston and James (1996) 
examine firms’ choices of bank debt, non-bank private debt and public debt. Cantillo 
and Wright (1997) and Krishnaswami et al. (1999) define only two debt options. Both 
studies classify public debt as “any publicly traded debt” and private debt as “any 
other debt in a firm’s books that is not publicly traded”. It is not clear whether 
syndicated loans are included in their dataset and, if so, under which of the two debt 
categories. To our knowledge only Esho et al. (2001) includes syndicated loans in 
their paper examining incremental debt financing decisions of large Asian firms in 
international bond and syndicated loan markets. However, their main focus is 
international debt issues and the analysis is limited to Japan and other (emerging) 
Asian countries in which syndicated loans is not a major source of corporate financing 
(see Altunbas et al. (2006) for further details).   
As mentioned above, recent developments, such as the establishment of secondary 
markets, the introduction of loan ratings and the rising interest from institutional 
investors, have helped make the distinction between syndicated loans and bilateral 
lending significantly clearer. These developments have, in turn, led the market to 
                                                                                                                                            
3 The issuance of public debt requires substantial fees to be paid to the investment banks underwriting 
the debt securities. In addition, there are other payments, such as those relating to filing, legal, printing 
and trustee fees.   
4 This is in contrast with the extensive theoretical and empirical literature on firms’ capital structure 
(Tirole (2006)). 12
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grow exponentially. Currently, syndicated loans are the only alternative to bond 
financing for large firms on account of the size and maturity of the funds that can be 
provided. This paper aims to build on the existing literature on firms’ financing 
decisions and, for the first time, compare the choice of the direct corporate bond 
market with that of its most direct competitor: the syndicated loan market. Another 
major novelty is that we consider a European environment. This is in contrast to the 
bulk of previous empirical evidence on firms’ financing decisions, which tend to be 
overwhelmingly based on US data (Denis and Mihov (2003), Houston and James 
(1996), Cantillo and Wright (1997) and Krishnaswami et al. (1999)). This European 
dimension is interesting for two main reasons. First, it coincides with the introduction 
of the euro, which created a largely integrated market for the financing of very large 
firms. Second, it also coincides with the development of the corporate bond market 
and of intense growth in the syndicated loan market making the euro area an ideal 
ground for the analysis of large debt corporate financing.   
Although syndicated loans are a large and increasingly important source of corporate 
finance, literature on syndicated loans is generally limited, albeit growing. Research 
in this area focuses, in general, on lenders’ incentives to syndicate loans (Simons 
(1993), Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Altunbas et al. (2005)) and the impact of 
information asymmetries on the formation of the syndicate structure (Lee and 
Mullineaux (2004), Jones et al. (2005), Bradley and Roberts (2003), Mullineaux and 
Pyles (2004), Esty and Meggison (2003) and Sufi (2007)). Syndicated loan 
announcements have also been used to evaluate possible bank certification effects on 
the market value of a firm (Meggison et al. (1995), Preece and Mullineaux (2003), 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Billett et al. (1995)). There is also evidence on 
the pricing of syndicated loans in relation to lender characteristics and the borrower’s 
default risk (Hubbard et al. (2002), Coleman et al. (2006), Thomas and Wang (2004), 
Angbazo et al. (1998) and Altman and Suggitt (2000)).
5  
                                                 
5 Yet again, almost all of the research on syndicated loan markets is overwhelmingly centred on the US 
(Steffen and Wahrenburg (2008) and Bosch (2007) are two recent interesting exceptions). In addition, 
this literature does not offer a comparison with the corporate bond market, which is, however, the most 
obvious benchmark candidate for the syndicated loan market. Thomas and Wang (2004) is an 
exception looking at price convergence. 13
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4.  Data and methodology  
The sample includes information on 1,377 listed non-financial firms with their head 
offices in the euro area
 and covers the period 1993-2006. We construct our dataset by 
combining data from four different commercial data providers: Thomson One Banker, 
Dealogic Loanware, Dealogic Bondware and Eurostat. In constructing the dataset, 
using Loanware and Bondware we first identify the firms that borrowed through 
syndicated loans and/or issued bonds during our sample period. Both databases 
provide extensive individual deal-by-deal information on all public corporate bond 
issues and syndicated loans granted. We obtain information on borrowers’ 
characteristics from their balance sheets and profit and loss accounts through 
Thomson One Banker. Company identification indicators (such as Sedol and ISIN 
codes) are utilized to match the Dealogic’s databases with Thomson One Banker.  We 
also hand-matched those companies that lack identification indicators. Lastly, we use 
Eurostat to obtain official statistics on macroeconomic data.   
We subdivide the firms in our sample among four categories, according to their 
borrowing record within the sample period. Firms are allocated to categories based on 
whether they issued: (I) only syndicated loans, (II) only bonds, (III) both syndicated 
loans and bonds in different years, and (IV) both syndicated loans and bonds at least 
once within the same year. Sample characteristics are reported in Table 1.  
Borrowers that used the syndicated loan market only are, on average, larger than those 
that borrowed exclusively through bond markets. In contrast, firms using only 
corporate bond financing have lower current profits but are better valued by the 
market, invest more, carry less financial leverage and have higher levels of debt 
maturing in the short term (debt maturing in less than one year). In other words, they 
would seem to be smaller firms with a strong growth potential. Likewise, as expected, 
firms tapping these two markets (Categories III and Category IV) are much larger 
than firms that use only one of the instruments. With an average size of USD 9.9 
billion, firms in Category IV have the borrowing needs and are large enough (i.e. 
normally better known by lenders) to be able to use both the bond and syndicated loan 
markets extensively. Between 1993 and 2006, these 164 firms issued 175 syndicated 
loans and 311 bonds in different years, and there were 288 instances in which these 14
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Table 1:  Sample characteristics 
















bonds at least 
once during 
the same year
Number of firms  159  890  164  164 
Number of loans issued  226  249  175 
Number of bonds issued  1219  280  311 
Number of joint issues within the same year     288 
      
Variables (means reported)       
Size (million USD)  2,159 1,427  4,239  9,924 
Debt to total assets (%)  30.97 21.38  29.60  28.93 
Short-term debt to total debt (%)  40.05 49.28  37.41  34.74 
Fixed assets to total assets (%)  32.12 18.95  30.68  28.69 
Market to book value  2.40 3.26  2.84  2.93 
Return on assets (%)  4.58 3.31  5.09  4.44 
Sales growth (%)  16.57 36.18  18.12  18.46 
Capital expenditure to total assets (%)  7.81 9.38  8.13  7.16 
Current ratio (%)  1.48 2.11  1.41  1.28 
 
To investigate how European firms’ choose between corporate bond and syndicated 
loan financing, we link firms’ choices of debt to firms’ attributes observed prior to a 
new issue. Building on the theoretical literature, we focus on firms’ financial 
characteristics that reflect factors such as debt renegotiation, inefficient liquidation 
concerns, transaction costs and information asymmetries. Specifically, we model the 
choice of debt market as follows:   
 






Choice of debt      Borrower financial characteristics
















    

  
   











We start by considering firms that issue either corporate bonds or syndicated loans in 
a given year. To do this, we employ a discrete dependent variable representing the 
        
. .
firms borrowed both from bond and loan markets simultaneously within the same year.  15
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debt choice of the firm. Choice of debt is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm issues a corporate bond and 0 if it decides upon a syndicated loan. We also 
and bonds within the same year. Hence, in this alternative specification, we also 
extend our dependent variable to host the third option of joint issuance. The 
underlying unit of observation is debt issuance within a specific year and a firm’s 
financial attributes one year prior to the issuance. To control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, we estimate a logistic model with random effects.
6 
We aim to account for the following characteristics of firms: corporate leverage, 
financial stress, liquidation value, profitability, liquidity, market-to-book value, sales 
growth, technology expenditure and size. Corporate leverage (defined as the ratio of 
total debt to total assets) measures the impact of current debt level on the choice of 
instrument for the new debt issue. Firms with higher leverage may already have a 
good reputation in the market and may be able to issue public debt more easily (Denis 
and Mihov (2003)). On the other hand, they could have a higher financial risk and 
renegotiation may be more complicated if using public debt (Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994) and Berlin and Loeys (1988)). This argument is possibly stronger for 
the ratio of short-term debt to total debt (debt maturing in less than one year), which 
can be interpreted as a more immediate proxy for financial stress (Esho et al. (2001) 
and Diamond (1991)).  
The liquidation value of the borrowing firm is proxied by using the fixed-to-total 
assets ratio. A larger proportion of fixed assets tends to be tangible (more visible to 
outside creditors) and can act as collateral. Therefore, in case of a default, the 
probability of recovering the debt will be higher for creditors. Profitability is 
measured as the return on assets (the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and 
depreciation to a firm’s total assets). This measure of profitability does not take into 
account developments in the liability structure of the firm already included in debt 
leverage ratios. From a lender’s perspective, a firm’s ability to pay back its debt is 
related to its visible ability to generate income. Hence, profitable firms are also more 
likely to take advantage of this visible signal of their ability to generate revenues and 
                                                 
6 Owing to a lack of variation in the discrete dependent variable that leads to a great loss of 
observations, we use random effect estimates throughout the study. A correlation matrix is presented in 
include in the estimations those observations where firms issued both syndicated loans 16
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issue public debt rather than syndicated loans (Denis and Mihov (2003)). The current
ratio offers a proxy for a firm’s resources relative to its debt in the short term. 
Contracting costs due to underinvestment and asset substitution are higher in the case 
of firms with more growth options. We use market-to-book value to gauge the growth 
potential of the firm (Smith and Watts (1992) and Barclay and Smith (1995)). 
Expected future growth increases a firm’s market value relative to its book value, 
since intangible assets – such as expectations of future profits – are not included in the 
book value of assets. We also account for expected future growth through sales
growth, measured as the annual percentage change of sales in respect of the previous 
year. Sales growth measures tangible past growth performance (or growth), while the 
market-to-book value is a forward-looking measure reflecting investors expectations’ 
for the firm.  
Market-to-book value and the size of a firm can also measure information 
asymmetries and proxy for associated incentive problems.
7 To lower such costs, firms 
may choose to borrow from banks that are equipped with monitoring facilities to 
mitigate moral hazard (Boot and Thakor (2008)). We employ a natural log of total 
assets to capture the effect of size on debt choice. Strong investment in technology 
measured via technology expenditure (relative to total assets) is also expected to be 
related to information asymmetries. Firms with high technology expenditure are less 
likely initially to tap the public debt markets owing to high monitoring and screening 
costs for lenders and strategic confidentiality reasons (Barclay and Smith (1995) and 
Hoven-Stohs and Mauer (1996)).   
We control for country conditions including regulation and competition effects with a 
set of country dummies. Countries in our dataset include Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and 
Finland. As debt and financing composition is also very sector-specific, we control for 
sector and industry factors through dummies for (i) high-tech & telecommunications, 
(ii) construction, (iii) business services, (iv) manufacturing, (v) transport and (vi) 
utilities. Finally, we account for macroeconomic conditions using two macroeconomic 
                                                                                                                                            
the appendix for a visual inspection of multicollinearity. To control for heteroscedasticity we use robust 
standard errors for multinomial logistic models.   
7  See Smith and Watts (1992), Barclay and Smith (1995), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Esho et al. 
(2001) and Denis and Mihov (2003). 17
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indicators to control for business cycle (change in GDP) and interest rate (one-year 
money market rate) developments. 
5.  Model results 
5.1 Binomial  specifications 
We construct our estimations progressively, starting from the simplest specification. 
We focus first on all the listed companies that tapped into only one type of debt, 
whether bonds or syndicated loans, during the period of study (Category I and 
Category II firms). For that, we use binomial logistic regressions to link 1,049 firms’ 
choice of debt market for 1,445 debt issues to their financial attributes observed the 
year prior to the issue. These estimates are presented in Table 2 (see the second 
column) marked as Model 1. Subsequently, the same estimation method is extended 
to include also the (normally larger) firms that used both instruments during the 
period of study, but not in the same year, i.e. Categories I to IV are included 
excluding those observations from Category IV where firms’ borrowed in the form of 
both bonds and loans (joint issuance) within the same year (see Model 2 in Table 2). 
This exercise yields a total of 1,377 firms and 2,460 debt issuances.
8 The signs and 
significance of the coefficients do not differ across the two models.     
5.1.1 Financial leverage and credibility    
More leveraged euro area firms tend to issue debt in the syndicated loan market. It 
seems that firms with a higher level of distress are more likely to chose syndicated 
loans owing to the greater ability of banks to screen and monitor borrowers (Boot and 
Thakor (2008)). Prior empirical studies by Houston and James (1996), Johnson 
(1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Cantillo and Wright (2000) and Denis and Mihov 
(2003) interpret high financial leverage as a reputational factor, while Esho et al. 
(2001) argues that higher leverage signals financial distress and reports a negative 
association between the issuance of public debt and financial leverage.  
                                                 
8 For further details, see Table 1. The total number of cases of debt issuance (2,460) by all firms equals 
the sum of loans and bonds listed in the rows titled “Number of loans issued” and “Number of bonds 
issued” in Table 1.   18
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5.1.2 Renegotiation and liquidation concerns  
 
European firms with higher levels of fixed assets are more likely to borrow from the 
syndicated loan market. Fixed assets are indeed easier to pledge in the event of 
syndicated loan borrowing than borrowing via the public markets. Fixed assets, 
however, can also be interpreted as a proxy for liquidation value (Esho et al. (2001) 
and Johnson (1997)). Compared with syndicated loans, bonds usually involve a larger 
number of investors, which makes it difficult to renegotiate the terms of a debt 
contract, as consensus is needed. Indeed, lenders in public debt markets are less able 
than banks to distinguish, on account of information asymmetries, between the 
optimality of liquidating or allowing the project to continue (Berlin and Loeys 
(1988)). This is often reflected in the debt contracts of corporate bonds in the form 
either of covenants that are too harsh (which may result in the premature liquidation 
of profitable projects), or of covenants that are too lenient (which may allow 
unprofitable projects to continue). In the case of syndicated loans, more stringent 
monitoring also helps to lower inefficient liquidation processes, as the creditors have 
more accurate information on the characteristics of borrowers. Overall, as the value of 
project liquidation falls, the benefit of efficient liquidation of unprofitable projects 
drops and firms are more likely to use public debt, thereby lowering monitoring costs 
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Table 2:  Binomial logistic regressions predicting firms’ choices of debt in the 
alternative syndicated loan and bond markets
 a, b
This table reports the estimates of random effect binomial logistic regressions predicting firms’ 
choices of debt in the alternative syndicated loan and bond markets. The binary dependent variable 
takes the value of 1 if the firm issues a bond and 0 if it borrows from the syndicated loan market. In 
Model 1, we include those firms that issued only one type of debt, whether bonds or syndicated loans, 
during the period of analysis (Category I and Category II). In Model 2, we use all firms (Categories I 
to IV), but exclude those observations of joint issuance within the same year by Category IV firms. 
Financial leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Financial stress is equal to the 
ratio of short-term debt to total debt. Liquidation value is measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets. Profitability is measured by the return on assets. Current ratio is measured by dividing current 
assets by total current liabilities. Market-to-book ratio is the book value of assets minus the book 
value of equity plus the market value of equity. Sales growth is the year-on-year percentage growth in 
sales. Size is measured by the total assets of a firm. Asset turnover is calculated by dividing total 
sales by total assets. GDP growth is the year-on-year percentage change in GDP. The interest rate is 
the one-year money market rate.   
    Model 1  Model 2  
Dependent variable: choice 
of debt market 
Bond = 1, Syndicated loan = 0  Bond = 1, Syndicated loan = 0 












Profitability  -0.0226 -0.0240
† 
(0.0164) (0.0094) 
Current ratio  0.2795 0.2438
§ 
(0.1824) (0.1013) 




Sales growth  0.0027 0.0023 
(0.0021) (0.0013) 




Technology expenditure  0.0421
† 0.0300
† 
   (0.0138)  (0.0079) 
GDP growth  -5.6350 2.2909 
(9.8898) (4.0334) 




Sector dummies  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Country dummies  Yes Yes 
       
Number of observations  1,445  2,460 
Number of firms  1,049  1,377 
a †, §, and
 ‡ indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.
 
b Standard errors are given in brackets.
 
 
5.1.3  Growth options    
European firms’ market-to-book value is positively related to the probability of 
issuing debt in the bond market. A higher market-to-book value indicates risk-
adjusted investors’ expectations on the future cash flows of the firms. Overall, 20
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European firms are better valued by equity markets and also tend to prefer public 
funding via the corporate bond markets. Therefore, syndicated loan markets stand as 
an alternative for bond markets when the borrowers are not so highly valued by the 
market, as more in depth knowledge of the borrower is warranted.
9  
We find that profitability increases firms’ likelihood of tapping syndicated loan 
markets. This is contrary to Denis and Mihov (2003), who report that profitable firms 
are more likely to issue public debt. Creditors participating in syndicated lending 
deals deem profitability to be a measurement of a firm’s ability to pay back its debt by 
generating income.  
Our results also suggest that higher capital expenditure leads to public debt funding by 
European firms. As with the market-to-book value, this probably captures the impact 
of the potential growth options through new investments. In other words, those firms 
with higher and visible capital investment spending, signalling further growth, prefer 
public debt markets. This explanation runs counter to the use of investment as a proxy 
to measure the concerns of information leakage on the choice of debt market. This 
literature hypothesises that firms with significant investment, in particular R&D 
investment, will have disclosure concerns. These firms may therefore prefer debt with 
fewer counterparties (i.e. syndicated or unilateral loans) as creditors. Indeed, using a 
direct proxy for R&D expenditure, earlier studies document a positive relationship 
between this variable and the use of bilateral bank debt (Denis and Mihov (2003) and 
Barclay and Smith (1995)). This latter explanation is likely to apply to the private 
unilateral bank but is probably less relevant in the case of the syndicated loan market.       
5.1.4  Size of firm and flotation costs  
Our findings for listed companies are twofold. Firstly, we find that larger firms are 
more likely to issue debt in the syndicated loan markets than the corporate bond 
market. Secondly, when including a larger sample with smaller firms from the larger 
dataset (see Table 4; this is discussed further in Section 5.4), the results show that size 
is positively related to the probability of issuing debt in both the corporate bond and 
syndicated loan markets. Therefore, syndicated loans seem to be the instrument of 
                                                 
9 Growth in sales (a backward-looking growth indicator) is also found to increase the likelihood of 21
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choice at the extreme where firms are very large. Here, the flexibility and the faster 
and relatively simple issuance process of arranging a syndicated loan may also play an 
important role. Likewise, for very large loans, syndicated loans seem to be the 
preferred option, as participating banks are probably valuing the accumulated credit 
in-depth knowledge on a specific borrower or sector from the lead bank.  
These findings complement previous empirical results for the issuance of corporate 
bonds, which showed that scale factors played a role due to legal admistrative and 
other more fixed costs when issuing public debt (Bhagat and Frost (1986), Smith 
(1986), Blackwell and Kidwell (1988), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Denis and Mihov 
(2003) and Esho et al. (2001)).  
5.1.5 Information asymmetries and choice of syndicated loans   
Agency costs associated with moral hazard problems may be mitigated by active 
monitoring by lenders (Diamond (1984 and 1991)). In the case of European firms, we 
report a positive relationship between the level of short-term debt and the possibility 
of borrowing through bond markets. A higher ratio of short-term to total debt may 
expose the firm to more intensive scrutiny by potential creditors and a higher 
bankruptcy risk. Regarding the latter, this result could indicate that firms with a very 
high level of risk may have to resort to private debt arrangements (Cantillo and 
Wright (2000), Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Blackwell and Kidwell (1988)). 
Alternatively, the pressure of short-term debt may be more optimal for financial 
markets if it increases the short-term pressures and monitoring on the borrower. 
Information asymmetries are also expected to be higher in firms with more uncertain 
growth options. As indicated earlier, it seems that syndicated loan market 
participation is more related to actual and tangible accounting profits, while corporate 
bond market issuance seems to be more related to the forward-looking expectations 
reflected in the market-to-book value.  
                                                                                                                                            
borrowing from bond markets, but only in Model 3. 22
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5.2 Multinomial specification 
To scrutinise the data further, we use a multinomial specification in which we 
transform the dependent variable choice of debt to comprise the option of joint
issuance. This would include bond and only syndicated loan issues. For this, to the 
previous sample we add those observations where a firm issues both a syndicated loan 
and a corporate bond within the same year (Categories I to IV). In this specification, 
there are 288 joint issues by 164 firms in Category IV, which includes the largest 
firms of the sample (see Table 1). Given their size, the financing needs of these firms 
are much higher than in the case of other firms. They also have the ability and 
established credibility to raise debt simultaneously in both markets within the same 
year. By making joint issuance the normalised alternative in our estimations, we aim 
to capture the behaviour of these very large firms when they are facing specific 
financial conditions. Since they can easily access both markets, they may opt to 
borrow only from a particular market at certain times depending on their financial 
state.  
The results are presented in Table 3 (see the last column in particular). The coefficient 
of a firm’s size confirms that larger firms are more likely to use both markets 
simultaneously. Firms with high financial leverage are more likely to borrow 
simultaneously from both markets, rather than tapping only the bond markets. The 
possibility of facing financial stress limits the firms’ ability to finance their activities 
from both markets simultaneously. Hence, a higher amount of shorter-term debt 
forces large firms to choose one of the alternative debt markets.  
Our findings on liquidation value and market-to-book value, set out in Section 5.1, 
continue to hold in the multinomial specifications. In the case of European firms, a 
higher project liquidation value increases the likelihood of borrowing through the 
syndicated loan markets, compared with a simultaneous use of both markets. On the 
other hand, growth potential leads to a choice of financing through the issuance of 
bonds. 23
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Table 3:  Multinomial logistic regressions predicting firms’ choices of issuing 
debt in the alternative syndicated loan and bond markets
 a, b
This table reports the estimates of multinomial logistic regressions predicting firms’ choices of 
debt. The dependent variable is defined as the three alternatives of issuing a bond, issuing a 
syndicated loan and issuing both simultaneously within a year. Joint issuance is the base 
outcome. Financial leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Financial stress is 
equal to the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. Liquidation value is measured by the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is measured by return on assets. Current ratio is measured 
by dividing current assets by total current liabilities. Market-to-book ratio is the book value of 
assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Sales growth is the year-on-
year percentage growth in sales. Size is measured by the total assets of a firm. Asset turnover is 
calculated by dividing total sales by total assets. GDP growth is the year-on-year percentage 
change in GDP. The interest rate is the one-year money market rate.   
   Model 3 
Dependent variable: choice of 
debt market. Joint issuance is 
the base outcome. 
Bond Syndicated  loan 
Financial leverage  -0.0146
† 0.0039 
(0.0055) (0.0059) 




Liquidation value  0.0048 0.0131
† 
(0.0046) (0.0047) 
Profitability  -0.0080 0.0163 
(0.0103) (0.0112) 
Current ratio  0.4458
† 0.2383 
(0.1385) (0.1469) 
Market–to-book value  0.0431
§ -0.0522 
(0.0238) (0.0330) 
Sales growth  -0.0001 -0.0023 
(0.0011) (0.0017) 




Technology expenditure  0.0041 -0.0193
§ 
   (0.0071)  (0.0086) 
GDP growth  6.9428 6.4946 
(6.4585) (6.4420) 
Interest rates  -0.0260 0.1225 
(0.1651) (0.1724) 
Sector dummies  Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes 
Country dummies  Yes Yes 
        
Number of observations  2,748 
Number of firms  1377 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R2  19.3 
a †, §, and
 ‡ indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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5.3 Larger sample with smaller firms  
In previous sections, the focus was on firms that are large and credible enough to be 
able to access public bond and/or the syndicated loan markets. In fact, our analysis 
includes only those observations where a firm issues a certain type of debt 
successfully.  
Hence, we enlarge the dataset by incorporating those firms and year observations in 
which firms do not tap any debt market to comprise 3,626 firms with 24,423 
observations. Compared with the previous sample, we add a further 2,228 listed non-
financial European firms to the sample. These firms did not issue any debt in either 
the bond or the syndicated loan markets between 1993 and 2006. Overall, they are 
relatively smaller than the original sample with a mean asset size of USD 791 million. 
The ability of smaller firms to borrow from these segments of the credit markets may 
be limited owing to the size of their financing needs. They could also lack the credit 
quality, which will reflect in their financial status.  
We assume that these firms have been financing themselves either through bilateral 
bank loans or other types of private debt.
10 In this specification, the dependent variable 
choice of debt takes the value of 0 if the firm does not issue any debt, 1 if it receives a 
syndicated loan, 2 if it issues a bond and 3 if it taps both debt markets simultaneously 
within the same year. We run a multinomial logistic regression with random effects 
using all observations, with no debt issuance being the base outcome. Table 4 displays 
the results




                                                 
10 Ideally, the analysis could have given better results if we had had the opportunity to include bilateral 
loans and other private debt incurred by the firms in our sample. However, owing to data unavailability 
we rely only on the findings of previous studies.    
11 To check for robustness we ran similar regressions with our original sample of 1,377 firms by 
including the years in which they do not issue any debt. We find that firms' characteristics affecting the 
choices of alternative debt options (bond, loan or both within the same year) are similar. This is due to 
the fact that the differences between the alternative choices are only present at marginal levels after the 
firms tap the market. However, these unreported findings only capture the characteristics affecting the 
firms’ decision of whether to borrow (via any of the three options) or not to borrow (no issuance) at all.   25
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Table 4:  Multinomial logistic regressions predicting firms’ choices of issuing 
debt in the alternative syndicated loan and bond markets – large sample 
a, b
This table reports the estimates of multinomial logistic regressions predicting firms’ choices of debt. 
The dependent variable is defined as the four alternatives of no issuance, issuing a bond, issuing a 
syndicated loan and joint issuance (issuing both simultaneously within a year). No issuance is the 
base outcome. Financial leverage is measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets. Financial stress 
is equal to the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. Liquidation value is measured by the ratio of fixed 
assets to total assets. Profitability is measured by return on assets. Current ratio is measured by 
dividing current assets by total current liabilities. Market-to-book ratio is the book value of assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Sales growth is the year-on-year 
percentage growth in sales. Size is measured by the total assets of a firm. Asset turnover is calculated 
by dividing total sales by total assets. GDP growth is the year-on-year percentage change in GDP. 
The interest rate is the one-year money market rate.   
   Model 4 
Dependent variable: choice of 
debt market 
Bond  Syndicated loan  Simultaneous issue 




(0.0017) (0.0026)  (0.0042) 




(0.0010) (0.0020)  (0.0036) 




(0.0018) (0.0025)  (0.0036) 
Profitability  -0.0027 0.0189
† 0.0011 
(0.0024) (0.0054)  (0.0092) 




(0.0144) (0.0602)  (0.1326) 
Market-to-book value  0.0766
† 0.0092  0.0476
† 
(0.0058) (0.0163)  (0.0167) 




(0.0003) (0.0008)  (0.0010) 




(0.0147) (0.0203)  (0.0332) 




   (0.0022) (0.0051)  (0.0064) 
GDP growth  1.8743 1.9730 -2.0649 
(1.9497) (2.3907)  (6.5654) 
Interest rates  -0.0581 0.0900  -0.0754 
(0.0446) (0.0597)  (0.1858) 
Sector dummies  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes 
Country dummies  Yes Yes  Yes 
           
Number of observations  24,423 
Number of firms  3605 
Prob > chi2  0.000 
Pseudo R2  17.86 
a †, §, and
 ‡ indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
b Standard errors are given in brackets. 
The signs and significance of the estimated coefficients for financial leverage, 
financial stress, liquidation value, sales growth and technology expenditure do not 
vary across the two alternative debt markets. Larger firms are more likely to borrow 
from syndicated loan and bond markets, as larger issues will be cost efficient when 26
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issuance costs are considered. It is also probably easier for a larger firm to raise 
external financing on top of bilateral debt arrangements.  
Therefore, it is more likely that smaller and medium-size firms meet their financing 
needs through private debt and bilateral bank loans. Firms with greater financial 
leverage are less likely to tap both markets. A high ex ante probability of financial 
stress forces them to refrain from both markets due to renegotiation concerns. Perhaps 
a choice of debt instrument with a single creditor (i.e. private finance or bilateral bank 
loans) will increase a firm’s possibility to renegotiate the terms of debt agreement 
effectively. Our findings also show that concerns about inefficient liquidation 
discourages firms from raising finance in the syndicated loan and bond markets. 
Variables signifying the growth potential of a firm are generally positively related to 
the probability of using the bond and syndicated loan markets.  
The two variables displaying different signs in estimated coefficients are current ratio 
and profitability: firms with high growth options measured by sales or the market-to-
book value are more likely to use the bond markets.
12 Results also show that a higher 
level of current assets is attached to the preference of bond markets.   
Overall, the motivation to use the syndicated loan markets is not different from that to 
syndicated loans are considered as a part of the debt options spectrum for all firms, 
regardless of size, the motivation of firms tapping these two alternative markets is 
found to be broadly similar. This result vouches for the need to consider both external 
financing alternatives (syndicated loans and corporate bonds) when considering the 
determinants of external financing.  
                                                 
12 In the literature, variables for growth options are also used to measure asymmetric information 
related to moral hazard and agency costs. 
use the bond markets when the larger sample with smaller firms is employed.When 27
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6.  Conclusions 
In the euro area, the syndicated loans market has developed rapidly during the last 
thirty years and today represents one-third of total debt and equity financing. We 
analyse the financial determinants of choice between corporate bonds and syndicated 
loans for a sample of 2,460 new debt issues by 1,377 listed euro area non-financial 
firms during the period 1993-2006. Our paper contributes to the literature on 
determinants of debt choice in two dimensions. First, unlike prior studies, we 
distinguish syndicated loans from ordinary bilateral loans and define it as a separate 
asset class. Second we provide evidence from euro area firms.      
The results indicate that for firms in the euro area, the choice of syndicated loans over 
bond financing is positively related to a firm’s size, financial leverage, profitability 
and the level of fixed relative to total assets. We find that firms preferring bond 
financing carry higher levels of short-term debt, which probably provides more 
extensive market monitoring but has more growth opportunities. Previous authors 
provide evidence that firms borrowing through public debt markets are larger, more 
profitable, more highly levered and have fewer growth opportunities than firms that 
rely primarily on bank financing. These findings suggest that in the pecking order, 
firms firstly borrow from banks until they establish the credibility to obtain financing 
from public bond markets.    
Comparing the debt choice of European firms – the bond market or the syndicated 
loan market – we present new evidence. Firms that are larger, more profitable, more 
highly levered, with a higher proportion of fixed to total assets and fewer growth 
options prefer syndicated loans over bond financing. Our findings do not contradict 
previous studies, as these rarely looked at syndicated loans and often categorised them 
as part of bilateral bank loans. We argue that, in the debt pecking order, syndicated 
loans are the preferred instrument on the extreme end where firms are very large, have 
high credibility and profitability, but fewer growth opportunities.   
Our findings also provide some evidence to the discussion of whether the recent 
developments (i.e. the development of a regulated and standardised secondary market 
and independently rated loan issues) in syndicated loan markets have triggered 
convergence between bond and syndicated loan markets from the perspective of a 
firm’s choice of debt. The results presented reveal that, in the euro area, the 
motivation of very large firms tapping these markets are not alike and financial 28
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features that lead to a particular choice of debt market are different. However, when 
considered as part of the debt options spectrum for all firms, regardless of size, the 
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Table 5:  Correlation matrix 
This table reports correlations between independent variables. Financial leverage is measured by the ratio of total 
debt to total assets. Financial stress is equal to the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. Liquidation value is 
measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. Profitability is measured by return on assets. Current ratio is 
measured by dividing current assets by total current liabilities. Market-to-book ratio is the book value of assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity. Sales growth is the year-on-year percentage 
growth in sales. Size is measured by the total assets of a firm. Asset turnover is calculated by dividing total sales 
by total assets GDP growth is the year-on-year percentage change in GDP. The interest rate is the one-year money 




















































































































































































Financial  leverage  1.00                
Financial  stress  -0.18  1.00               
Liquidation  value  0.26  -0.22  1.00              
Profitability  -0.11  -0.07 0.04 1.00                 
Current  ratio  -0.34  -0.08  -0.19 0.03 1.00               
Market-to-book  value  -0.06 0.00  -0.12 0.08 0.01 1.00             
Sales  growth  -0.04 0.00  -0.09  -0.05 0.05 0.10 1.00           
Size  of  firm  0.11  -0.20 0.16 0.18  -0.17  -0.05  -0.02 1.00         
Technology  expenditure 0.04  -0.09 0.14 0.06  -0.02 0.10 0.16  -0.01  1.00       
GDP  growth  0.05  -0.06 0.09 0.11  -0.07 0.03 0.01 0.03  0.03  1.00     
Interest  rates  -0.01 0.04 0.09 0.05  -0.01  -0.05 0.01 0.05  0.03  0.16  1.00 
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